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THE HIGHER FORMS OF ABSTRACTION—
THEIR NATURE.'
BV PROF. TH. RIBOT.
IT is unnecessary to enter in detail into the researches of the last
thirty years as to the seat and the nature of images. Yet since
these have been the point of departure of the following inquiry, the
results may be briefly summarised.
It is generally admitted that the image occupies the same seat
as the percept of which it is a weak and incomplete residuum, i. e.,
in order to produce itself in consciousness it demands the putting
into activity of certain definite portions of the cerebral centres.
The energy of the representative faculty does not merely vary from
individual to individual in a general manner: there are particular
forms of imagination, constituted by the very marked predomi-
nance of a certain group of representations, visual, auditory, mus-
cular, olfactory, gustatory.
Normal observations, and still more pathological researches,
have thus determined certain types. We may also (though this is
mere hypothesis and difficult to verify) admit a "mixed" or "in-
different " type, in which the different species of sensations are rep-
resented by corresponding images of equal clearness and vigor,
without marked predominance of any one group, whilst still main-
taining their relative importance: e. g., it is clear that in man the
visual and olfactory images cannot be equivalent in absolute im-
portance. Excluding this indifferent type, we have three principal
"pure" types: visual, auditory, muscular or motor, signifying a
tendency to represent things in terms borrowed from vision, from
sound, or from movement. If we push the investigation further,
we find that these types again imply variations or subtypes. Thus
there may be a lively faculty for representation of complex visual
1 Translated from tlie French by Frances A. Welby.
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forms (faces, landscapes, monuments) along with a weak sense for
graphic signs (printed or written words) and so on.
The numerous works devoted to this subject, and too well
known to be insisted on here, lead us to this conclusion : that
there is no general faculty of imagination. This is a vague term
which designates very different individual variations : these last
alone have any psychological reality, and are alone important in
cognising the mechanism of the intellect.
May it not be the same for the faculty of conception? May
not the word "general idea" or "concept" be in its kind the
equivalent of the word image, namely a vague formula,— its psy-
chological reality lying in types or variations as yet undetermined?
I am exposing for ideas, the problem that has already been set
forth for images, while recognising its much greater obscurity.
The psycho-physiological conditions of the existence of concepts
are practically unknown : this is a terra incognita wherein the new
psychology has hardly adventured itself, and where it would in-
deed have been chimerical to tread before the preliminary study of
the image.
The question I have set myself to elucidate is very modest,
very limited and circumscribed, representing only part of the prob-
lem indicated above. It may, however, teach us something of the
ultimate nature of concepts. It is as follows :
When we think, hear, or read a general term, what arises as
sign in consciousness, directly and without reflexion^
I have purposely italicised these words in order to emphasise
my principal aim, which was to discover the instantaneous opera-
tions (conscious or unconscious) that occur in such a case, in per-
sons whose habits of mind are widely different. I endeavored as
much as possible to eliminate reflexion and to seize the mental
state. With time and effort, minds that are least apt in abstrac-
tion will arrive at a more or less successful translation of general
terms, or at the substitution for them of some mangled and halting
definition. I set myself as far as possible to suppress this second-
ary phase of the mental process, and to arrest it at the first, in
order to determine what the word evokes immediately and in what
degree this differs with the individual.
In order to make the answers more exactly comparable, I in-
terrogated only the adults of both sexes, excluding all children. It
was indispensable to my investigation that it should comprise peo-
ple of very different degrees of culture, habits of mind, and profes-
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sion. The principal classes were mathematicians, physicists, doc-
tors, scientists, philosophers, painters, musicians, architects, men
of the world, women, novelists, poets, artisans. The last class
made such confused replies that I must regard their data as worth-
less. Too much is left for individual interpretation. The total
number of persons interrogated amounted to one hundred and
three.
The method was invariably the same. We said to the subject
:
"I am going to pronounce certain words; will you tell me directly,
without reflexion, whether this word calls up anything or nothing
in your mind? If anything, what is suggested to you?" The
reply was noted down at once ; if delayed beyond live to seven sec-
onds, it was held to be null, or doubtful. In the case of naive sub-
jects, I employed certain preliminaries : before pronouncing ab-
stract words, concrete terms (designating a monument, or person)
such as would evoke a simple image, were heard ; then the im-
pulse being given, I proceeded to the enumeration of general
terms.
The words which served as material for the inquiry were four-
teen in number, proceeding from the concrete to the highest ab-
stractions. They were enunciated in an indifferent order and were
as follows: dog, animal, color, form, justice, goodness, virtue, law,^
number, force, time, relation, cause, infnity.
The inquiry was invariably oral, never in writing, the greatest
care being taken to prevent the person from knowing the end in
view, unless afterwards : which led in certain cases to interesting
explanations. The very nature of my method prevented me from
extending it as widely as I could have wished. I could not, as was
done in England, distribute printed questions among the public,
because it was necessary to note the spontaneous answer immedi-
ately before it was corrected by later reflexion. Moreover, I
needed unsophisticated subjects, ignorant of my purpose, and
therefore eliminated all whom I suspected of being even indirectly
acquainted with it.
The majority were interrogated on the fourteen terms cited
above, others on a few only : so that the total number of responses
was over nine hundred. It would be beside the mark to publish
them here. They are nothing more than data which have to be
interpreted. Three principal or pure types appear to stand out
1 The word "law" was purposely chosen for its ambiguity; physical laws, moral or social
laws. The immense majority of answers were in the juristic sense. Ex.. Code, Law of the
Twelve Tables, a judge, woman with scales, etc.
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from them, besides the failures or mixed cases. These may be
termed the concrete type, the visual typographic type, and the aud-
itory type. Each of these corresponds with a particular mode of
representing the general idea. We will examine them separately.
I. Concrete Type.—Here the abstract word nearly always
evokes an image, vague or precise ; usually visual, sometimes mus-
cular. It is not a simple sign, it does not represent the total sub-
stitution, it is not dry, and finally reduced. It is immediately and
spontaneously transformed into a concrete. In fact the persons of
this type think only in images. Words are for them no more than
a kind of vehicle, a social instrument of mutual comprehension.
When a sequence of general or abstract terms passes through their
minds, what really passes is a succession of concretes, save for the
very abstract words which "evoke nothing." This is an answer I
have often received, and which, in virtue of its importance, will be
considered in another article.
The concrete type appears to be the most widely distributed ;
it obtains almost to exclusion among women, artists, and all who
have not the habit of scientific abstraction. I have selected a few
examples from among the many observations belonging to this
type.
A painter.— Cause : nothing. Relation : relations of terms ; re-
cital, written report. Law : judges in red robes. Number : vague.
Color: contrast between green of plant, and red of drapery. Form:
a round block, a woman's shoulder. Sound: a murmur. Dog: ears
of a dog running. Animal: vague collection, as in certain Dutch
pictures. Force: hits out with his fists. Goodness: his young
motlier, seen vaguely. Time: Saturn with his scythe. Infinity: a
black hole.
A woman.— Cause: I had been the cause of her son's success.
Latv: the government is bad. Color: sees an impressionist picture
by her son. Form: names a beautiful person. Goodness and Vir-
tue: names two people who each have this quality. Force: sees
men fighting. Relation: social relations between husband and wife.
Justice: sees an audience-hall and judges. Dog: sees a dog that
bit one of her parents. Infitiity: nothing. Time: a metronome.
These two interrogatories are complete. I might proceed by
another method : that of taking each general term (law, cause,
number, etc.) and quoting all the answers received, among which
many would be identical. Such an enumeration would be long and
superfluous : we cannot, however, neglect a few of the particulars.
For the word cause, several persons (women, artists, people in so-
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ciety) replied ''cause icivbre,'' " /^roccs cclcbre,'' for the most part
mentioning one only, and that some recent trial. At first this reply
annoyed me, and appeared to be useless for my inquiry. Later, on
the other hand, I felt it to be instructivf, because it characterises
better than any description the type which I have denoted as con-
crete, and the particular turn of this kind of mind, in which the
abstract sense does not present itself, at any rate at the beginning.
I may also note two answers given me immediately by a cele-
brated painter:
—
Number: I see many brilliant points. Law: I see
parallel lines. (Is this the unconscious idea of levelling by the
law ?)
The terms goodness and virtue suggested answers wliich are
easily summarised: the}' fall into two categories, (i) Nothing;
this answer does not belong to the concrete type; (2) a definite
person, who was always named and who thus becomes the incarna-
tion, the concrete representation.
Nearly all the images evoked belong to the visual sense ; the
word force, however, most frequently called up pure muscular im-
ages, or the same accompanied by a vague visual representation.
Example—Seeing somebody lifting a weight; I vaguely see some-
thing pulling ; a weight suspended by a ring ; a string drawing on
a nail
;
pressure of my fist in a fluid ; the Marshal of Saxony break-
ing an ecu of six pounds, etc.
I have been describing the ordinary and principal form of the
concrete type. It consists in the immediate and spontaneous sub-
stitution of a particular case (fact or individual) for the general
term. In certain observations a slightly different variation may be
detected ; I have encountered it among several historians and
learned men. In the ordinary type, the whole (general) is thought
by means of the part (concrete); in the variation, the thinking is
by analogy, and the mechanism seems to be reduced to pure asso-
ciation. A few examples will explain the distinction. The replies
in duplicate were given by different persons. Number: the ''Lan-
guage of Calculation," Pythagoras. Cause: Hume's theory of cau-
sality ; Kant's theory. Law: the "Tables of Malaga," Montes-
quieu's definition. Color: the chemistry of the spectrum. Justice
:
Littre's definition. Animal: the Trept "Av^iy? of Aristotle. Time:
a vague metaphysical theory. Relation: discussion of Ampere and
Tracy on this subject. Lnfinity: books on mathematics. Color.
treatises of photography, etc.
It might be objected that there is a certain association in ordi-
nary cases as in these ; but the distinction will readily be per-
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ceived. The former proceed from that which contains, to the con-
tent—from the class to the fact : they think the whole by means of
the part ; there is an internal association. The latter form asso-
ciations beside and from without. Apparently these do not reach
to the concrete, they stop half way; for a complete generality they
substitute a semi-generality. Further than this, my data are
neither sufficiently numerous, nor clear enough, for the point to be
insisted on.
2. Visual Typographic Type.—Nothing is easier to define.
In its pure form it consists in seeing printed words and nothing
more ; in three cases words were seen written. Among some the
vision of the printed words was accompanied by a concrete image
as in the first type, but only for semi concrete concepts (dog, ani-
mal, color); but for the higher abstracts (time, cause, infinity,
etc.) the typographical vision alone exists.^ This mode of repre-
sentation is widely distributed among those who have read much;
but there are many exceptions.
No doubt many of my readers will discover from self-observa-
tion that they belong to this type. I have further noticed that all
who have this mode of representation regard it as normal, and
necessary, in any one who knows how to read. This is a fallacy.
I do not possess it myself in the faintest degree, and have met
many others who resemble me.
Thus I was little prepared to discover this type; and had even
reached my thirtieth observation without suspecting it, when I en-
countered such a clear case as to put me on the track. I was in-
terrogating a well-known physiologist. To every word except Law
and Form, he replied "I see them in printed characters" and was
able to describe these accurately.
Even the words dog,'^ anhnal, color, were unaccompanied by any
image. He volunteered further information which may be reduced
to the statement, "I see everything typographically." The same
holds good for concrete objects. If he hears the names of his inti-
mate friends whom he meets every day, he sees the names printed ;
it is only by an effort of thought that he sees the image. The word
"water" appears to him as if printed, and he has no vision of a
liquid. If he thinks of carbonic acid, or nitrogen, he sees indiffer-
ently either the words printed or the symbols C0-.», N. He does
1 For the word infinity, those who fall under this type see the printed word, or the mathemat-
ical sign -c .
2 It should be noted that he lived among these animals and experimented with them almost
daily.
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not see the complex formula; of organic chemistry, but the words
only.
Surprised (from the reasons above indicated) at this observa-
tion—of the sincerity and precision of which there could be no
doubt— I continued my investigation, and discovered this mode of
thinking in general terms to be sufficiently common. Several cases
indeed were as pure and as detailed as the one just cited. Thence-
forward 1 adopted the habit of invariably asking at the close of my
interrogatory, "Did you see the words printed?"
Several people remarked that they had read a great deal, and
corrected many proofs, and that this would account for their be-
longing to the typographical visual type. The influence of habit
is certainly enormous, but is no adequate explanation here, since
there are many exceptions. I have myself read and corrected many
proofs, but no word ever appeared in my consciousness as printed,
unless after considerable effort, and then vaguely. Hence this
mode must be due in great part to natural disposition.
Among the compositors questioned I found : (i) That they
saw my fourteen words printed in some special type, which they
occasionally specified
; (2) they had a concomitant image for semi-
concrete terms; (3) for abstract terms no image accompanied the
typographical vision. Here we have the superposition of two
types: the one natural, and of primitive formation (concrete type),
the other acquired, and of secondary formation (typographical vis-
ual type).
In short,—in many minds the existence of the concept is asso-
ciated with a clear vision of the printed word and nothing be-
yond it.
3. Auditory Type.—In its pure form this seems to be rare. It
consists in having in mind nothing but signs (auditory images) un-
accompanied either by the vision of printed words or by concrete
images. Possibly it may preponderate among orators and preach
ers ; of this I have no documentary evidence. Musicians do not
appear to belong to this type.
One very clear and complete case of the kind I have, however,
encountered. This was a polyglot physician known as the author
of several works, who for many 3'ears had lived among books and
manuscripts. He has no trace of typographical vision, but all
words "sound in his ear." He can neither read nor compose with-
out articulating; as the interest of his book or work grows upon
him he speaks aloud—"He must hear himself. " In his dreams
there are few or no visual images; he hears his voice and that of
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his interlocutors : "His dreams are auditory." None of my words,
even when semi-concrete, evoked visual images.
In most cases the auditory type is not clear. For very general
terms the heard word alone exists, but in proportion as the con-
crete is approached, the sound is accompanied by an image; thus
returning upon our former type.
It is worth while to note that the term flatus vocis " nomina,"
first employed in the Middle Ages and which has since become the
formula of Nominalism, seems by its nature to indicate that it was
originally invented by persons who belonged to the auditory type,
and I may even hazard an hypothesis. The typographical visual
type did not exist (printing not being invented) ; it is true that a
substitute might have existed in the graphic visual type (reading of
manuscripts). But considering that in the Middle Ages instruction
was essentially oral, that learning came rather through listening
than by reading, that the oratorical jousts and arguments were
daily and interminable, it is undeniable that the conditions of de-
veloping the auditory type were highly favorable here.
I need hardly say that the three types described above are
rarely met with in the pure and complete form. As a rule a mixed
type prevails : a concrete image for certain words, and typograph-
ical vision, or auditory images, for others. To sum up : all cases
seem to be capable of reduction to the following : (i) The word
heard ; beyond this, nil (we shall subsequently have to examine
this "nothing"); (2) typographical vision alone; (3) the same, ac-
companied by a concrete image; (4) the word heard, accompanied
invariably by a concrete image.
4. Prior to the commencement of this inquiry I felt much hes-
itation on one point : should one in questioning use general words
or genexdil propositions? I decided in favor of words because these
are brief, simple, isolated, and undisguised, and have the advan-
tage of being understood directly, while they in no way suggest to
the subject what line he is to follow.
I still however felt scruples in the matter. Was not the inves-
tigation as conducted on these lines a little artificial? In point of
fact, general terms most frequently occur as members of a phrase,
cooperating with others, and connected with them by certain rela-
tions. I therefore recommenced my inquiry, using the same
method, but replacing words by phrases. The general propositions
employed are purposely trite, to avoid contradiction, and to ascer-
tain the immediate mental state. They were as follows :
Cause invariably precedes effect.— Infinity has several mean-
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ings.— Is Space infinite?—Has Time any limits ?—Law is a neces-
sary relation.— I need not enlarge upon the results: they are
precisely the same as for words. In every case, and for each person,
there is one predominating word which absorbs all the content of
the phrase, and is a substitute for it. On this the instantaneous
mental operation is concentrated.
If of the concrete type, the subject sees images. In the second
phrase, e. g., everything converges on the word infinity. Replies :
Sensation of obscurity and depth, vague luminous circles, a sort of
cupola, a never-receding horizon, etc. If a typographic visualist,
the printed sentence is seen less clearly than the simple words
:
"in minute characters; no capitals"; some persons glimpse it rap-
idly: others see only "the principal word printed."
For the pure auditory type, the answer is always very simple.
"1 hear the sentence, I see absolutely nothing."
The new method therefore simply confirms the previous obser-
vations, with no variations. This identity of result seems to me to
militate against a distinction admitted by many authors. In the
classical treatises a distinction is made between "necessary ideas"
and "necessary truths" (I use their terms uncritically), i. e., gen-
eral concepts and general propositions. Example : cause, princi-
ple of causality. In my opinion there is merely a difference of
form between the two positions, the one psychological, the other
logical. A concept is a judgment in a state of envelopment, or of
result. The proposition is a word in the state of development. The
difference is not material, but formal; it is the passage from syn-
thesis to analysis.
I thought that after an interval of two years it might be inter-
esting to repeat the same inquiry on the same people; but there-
suits were not encouraging in this direction. Some, remembering
the previous investigation, declared that "they felt themselves in-
fluenced beforehand." Others, who had a more vague recollection
(perhaps because they did not understand the object of the inquiry)
gave answers analogous to their former replies. In short, notwith-
standing the lapse of time, and change of circumstances, each
seemed to be consistent with his former self.
I must admit that in the preceding research the psychological
nature of the concepts was studied under a particular aspect. This
objection was made at the London Psychological Congress^ by the
1 The results of the investigation were published, partly in the Revue Philosophiqut, October
1891, partly at the International Congress of Psychology, second session, London, 1892 Interna-
tional Congress of Experimental Psychology. London : Williams & Norgate, pp. 20, at seq.).
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President, Professor Sidgwick, whose remarks may be summarised
as follows :
First, Professor Sidgwick believes that the act of suddenly
calling attention to a word, in a person not accustomed to intro-
spective observation, evokes a response which does not exactly cor-
respond to the state ordinarily aroused by such words. In his own
particular case he has found that the images evoked (usually vis-
ual) were extremely feeble, but that when he dwelt upon them they
were enlivened. Secondly, the images vary a great deal according
to the terms employed; for example, when he is occupied with
mathematical and logical trains of thought, he sees only the printed
words. If he is engaged upon the subject of political economy, the
general terms sometimes have for their concomitants extremely
fantastic images : like value, for instance, which is accompanied
by the indistinct and fragmentary image of a man placing some-
thing upon the pan of a balance. Thirdly, when for such words as
infinity, relation, etc., the subject answers nothing, the only conclu-
sion justified is that the subject is incapable of describing the con-
fused elements which exist in his consciousness. Fourthly, Pro-
fessor Sidgwick's own experience points to the conclusion that my
types may succeed each other in the same person.
On this last point—the co-existence of several modes of con-
ception in the same person— I am quite in agreement with Profes-
sor Sidgwick, and my own data, drawn up from personal observa-
tions, would provide me with sufficient evidence. At the same
time the object of my investigation was not to determine the man-
ner in which each individual conceives, but the forms under which
men as a whole think of concepts. Nor did I profess to follow the
work of the mind when it resolves its general ideas into concretes,
when it makes coin out of its bank-notes, but only to seize the sub-
jacent labor that accompanies the current and facile use of general
terms, in speaking, listening, reading or writing. No doubt it
would be advisable to treat the subject in another manner by stud}-
ing—no longer the momentary state that corresponds with the
presence of the concept in consciousness—but the stable organised
turn of mind due to a long habit of dealing with concepts. To this
end it would be desirable more especially to question mathema-
ticians and metaphysicians. My data are neither numerous nor
clear enough to permit of my hazarding any dictum on this sub-
ject. Some mathematicians have told me that they invariably re-
quire a figured representation, a construction, and that even when
these are considered as purely fictitious their support is indispen-
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sable to the train of reasoning. Contra those who think geometric-
ally, there are others who think algebraically, eliminating all con-
figuration, or construction, and proceeding b\ simple analysis with
the aid of signs : which (with the necessary corrections and descrip-
tions) would bring the first under the concrete, and the second
under the audito-motor t\ pe. Among metaphysicians the t}po-
graphical visual type seems largely to predominate. One (who is
well known) belongs to the pure auditory type. All this, however,
is inadequate ; the investigation would have to be followed out, by
and upon others.
A young Russian doctor, M. Adam Wizel, who was interested
in the subject, put the same questions (following the method indi-
cated above) to persons in the hypnotic state. Admitting the un-
conscious mental activities to preponderate in this state he asked
whether by this procedure it would not be possible to penetrate
farther into- the unknown substrate of consciousness. His experi-
ments were undertaken at the Salpetriere, in Charcot's, clinique,
upon six women—hysterics of the first order. The subjects were
first put into a state of somnambulism, then after a preliminary ex-
planation were questioned, as above. After getting the answers
Wizel ordered the subjects to forget all that had happened, and
then woke them. He now began again in the waking state, asking
the same questions, so that he was able to compare the answers
given successively in the two cases. They are nearly always
clearer and more explicit during somnambulism than during the
waking state, as may be judged by the following example (taken
from the third observation) :
QUESTIONS. SOMNAMUULISM. WAKING STATE.
Dog : A big grey animal Nothing
Form : A red cardboard head Nothing
Law : A tribunal Nothing
Justice
:
A magistrate State of justice
Number
:




Where the replies are concrete in the two cases I note a toler-
able analogy between them. M. Wizel (who eliminated all doubtful
cases, and any accompanied by crises) never encountered the typo-
graphical visual type, nor the pure auditory type, in his experi-
ments. His six hysterics belong to the concrete type, with the
predominance of visual images—much more rarely of motor im-
ages, provoked by the word "force." The answer "nothing" is
very frequent ; less so, however, during somnambulism than dur-
ing the waking state.
